Dynamics and stability of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs

Daron Acemoglu*, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

54 Scopus citations

Abstract

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1446-1476
Number of pages31
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume102
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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