TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamics of profit-sharing games
AU - Augustine, John
AU - Chen, Ning
AU - Elkind, Edith
AU - Fanelli, Angelo
AU - Gravin, Nick
AU - Shiryaev, Dmitry
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings whereby each team’s profit is given by a submodular function and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e.they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so.
AB - An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings whereby each team’s profit is given by a submodular function and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e.they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84924116729&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1080/15427951.2013.830164
DO - 10.1080/15427951.2013.830164
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84924116729
SN - 1542-7951
VL - 11
SP - 1
EP - 22
JO - Internet Mathematics
JF - Internet Mathematics
IS - 1
ER -