Effective persuasion

Ying Chen*, Wojciech Olszewski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any insight regarding how we should argue in debates? We provide an answer in a model in which each discussant wants to convince the audience that a specific state holds. If the discussants' payoffs in the audience's posterior are concave above and convex below the prior and exhibit loss aversion, then the leading discussant should give precedence to the weaker argument, and the follower should respond to a weak argument weakly and to a strong argument strongly. Such characterizations are also obtained for the case of choosing between independent and correlated arguments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)319-347
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume55
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Effective persuasion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this