Efficiency bounds for sequential resource allocation auctions

Junjik Bae*, Eyal Beigman, Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh Vohra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations


Market-based mechanisms such as auctions have been widely considered for various network resource allocation problems. We consider such a mechanism motivated by dynamic spectrum sharing applications. In this model multiple homogeneous units of a given resource are to be allocated to two agents. We study a sequential second price auction for allocating these resource units. It is well known that such auctions can have inefficient equilibria. For the case of two bidders, we show that the value of the allocation obtained in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is at least 1 - e-1 of the value of the efficient allocation. Furthermore, we show that this bound is asymptotically tight as the number of goods increases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2007, CDC
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)1424414989, 9781424414987
StatePublished - 2007
Event46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2007, CDC - New Orleans, LA, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2007Dec 14 2007

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370


Other46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2007, CDC
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans, LA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization


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