@inproceedings{868464b93e664c188745059a5d2ee24c,
title = "Efficiency bounds for sequential resource allocation auctions",
abstract = "Market-based mechanisms such as auctions have been widely considered for various network resource allocation problems. We consider such a mechanism motivated by dynamic spectrum sharing applications. In this model multiple homogeneous units of a given resource are to be allocated to two agents. We study a sequential second price auction for allocating these resource units. It is well known that such auctions can have inefficient equilibria. For the case of two bidders, we show that the value of the allocation obtained in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is at least 1 - e-1 of the value of the efficient allocation. Furthermore, we show that this bound is asymptotically tight as the number of goods increases.",
author = "Junjik Bae and Eyal Beigman and Randall Berry and Honig, {Michael L.} and Rakesh Vohra",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2007.4434913",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "1424414989",
series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "765--770",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2007, CDC",
address = "United States",
note = "46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2007, CDC ; Conference date: 12-12-2007 Through 14-12-2007",
}