Efficiency of large private value auctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

61 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equlibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are large, and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)37-68
Number of pages32
JournalEconometrica
Volume69
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2001

Keywords

  • Asymptotic efficiency
  • Auctions
  • Efficiency
  • Large auctions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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