Effluent regulation and long-run optimality

Daniel F. Spulber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

115 Scopus citations

Abstract

The long-run efficiency properties of regulatory instruments are examined in a multiple-input framework. The effluent tax and tradeable permit are shown to be efficient with free entry and exit of small firms. The across-the-board effluent standard results in excessive entry and excessive industry pollution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)103-116
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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