Eliciting information from multiple experts

Asher Wolinsky*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

55 Scopus citations

Abstract

A decision maker DM has to elicit information from informed experts regarding the desirability of a certain action. The experts share similar preferences, which differ significantly from these of DM, and they possess different pieces of information. The question is how much information DM can elicit, despite the difference in interests. The focus is on how DM can take advantage of the multiplicity of experts. For the case in which DM cannot commit to a mechanism, the main observation is that allowing partial communication among the experts might result in revelation of more information than either full communication or no communication. In the case in which DM can commit to a mechanism the maximum inducement for revelation is attained by mechanisms that are non-monotonic in the information. The analysis makes repeated use of the idea that experts understand that their reports matter only when they are pivotal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)141-160
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2002

Keywords

  • Communication
  • Information transmission
  • Multiple experts

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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