Abstract
A decision maker DM has to elicit information from informed experts regarding the desirability of a certain action. The experts share similar preferences, which differ significantly from these of DM, and they possess different pieces of information. The question is how much information DM can elicit, despite the difference in interests. The focus is on how DM can take advantage of the multiplicity of experts. For the case in which DM cannot commit to a mechanism, the main observation is that allowing partial communication among the experts might result in revelation of more information than either full communication or no communication. In the case in which DM can commit to a mechanism the maximum inducement for revelation is attained by mechanisms that are non-monotonic in the information. The analysis makes repeated use of the idea that experts understand that their reports matter only when they are pivotal.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 141-160 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2002 |
Funding
The author thanks Donato Gerardi for useful comments. This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 9911761.
Keywords
- Communication
- Information transmission
- Multiple experts
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics