Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation

James Schummer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Scopus citations

Abstract

We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent-2-position case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent-position case, many "arbitrary" such rules exist, so we consider additional requirements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness, the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley-Scarf housing model (no divisible good). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving "bribes." Finally, we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy-proofness. The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)293-318
Number of pages26
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume30
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2000

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this