@inproceedings{ffba01ff9124435d82a738f412db468c,
title = "Envy, truth, and profit",
abstract = "We consider profit maximizing (incentive compatible) mechanism design in general environments that include, e.g., position auctions (for selling advertisements on Internet search engines) and single-minded combinatorial auctions. We analyze optimal envy-free pricings in these settings, and give economic justification for using the optimal revenue of envy-free pricings as a benchmark for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. Moreover, we show that envy-free pricing has a simple nice structure and a strong connection to incentive compatible mechanism design, and we exploit this connection to design prior-free mechanisms with strong approximation guarantees.",
keywords = "envy-free pricing, optimal auction, prior-free, revenue maximization, truthful mechanisms",
author = "Hartline, {Jason D} and Qiqi Yan",
year = "2011",
month = jun,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1145/1993574.1993612",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781450302616",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "243--252",
booktitle = "EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 ; Conference date: 05-06-2011 Through 09-06-2011",
}