TY - CHAP

T1 - Epistemic Game Theory

AU - Dekel, Eddie

AU - Siniscalchi, Marciano

PY - 2015/1/1

Y1 - 2015/1/1

N2 - Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about.. .what others believe about the rationality of players imply regarding play in a game? Being explicit about these assumptions can be important, because solution concepts are often motivated intuitively in terms of players' beliefs and their rationality; however, the epistemic analysis may show limitations in these intuitions, reveal what additional assumptions are hidden in the informal arguments, clarify the concepts or show how the intuitions can be generalized. A further premise of this chapter is that the primitives of the model- namely, the hierarchies of beliefs-should be elicitable, at least in principle. Building upon explicit assumptions about elicitable primitives, we present classical and recent developments in epistemic game theory and provide characterizations of a nonexhaustive, but wide, range of solution concepts.

AB - Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about.. .what others believe about the rationality of players imply regarding play in a game? Being explicit about these assumptions can be important, because solution concepts are often motivated intuitively in terms of players' beliefs and their rationality; however, the epistemic analysis may show limitations in these intuitions, reveal what additional assumptions are hidden in the informal arguments, clarify the concepts or show how the intuitions can be generalized. A further premise of this chapter is that the primitives of the model- namely, the hierarchies of beliefs-should be elicitable, at least in principle. Building upon explicit assumptions about elicitable primitives, we present classical and recent developments in epistemic game theory and provide characterizations of a nonexhaustive, but wide, range of solution concepts.

KW - Backward induction

KW - Common-prior assumption

KW - Conditional probability systems

KW - Epistemic game theory

KW - Forward induction

KW - Hierarchies of beliefs

KW - Interactive epistemology

KW - Lexicographic probability systems

KW - Rationalizability

KW - Solution concepts

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84922426314&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84922426314&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4

DO - 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84922426314

T3 - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

SP - 619

EP - 702

BT - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

PB - Elsevier B.V.

ER -