Epistemic game theory: beliefs and types

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

Modelling what each agent believes about her opponents, what she believes her opponents believe about her, and so on, plays a prominent role in game theory and its applications. This article describes Harsanyi’s formalism of type spaces, which provides a simple, elegant representation of probabilistic belief hierarchies. A special emphasis is placed on the construction of rich type spaces, which can generate all ‘reasonable’ belief hierarchies in a given game. Recent developments, employing richer representation of beliefs, are also considered.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
EditorsSteven N Durlauf, Lawrence E Blume
PublisherPalgrave-Macmillan
Edition2
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-349-58802-2
ISBN (Print)978-0-333-78676-5
StatePublished - 2008

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    Siniscalchi, M. (2008). Epistemic game theory: beliefs and types. In S. N. Durlauf, & L. E. Blume (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2 ed.). Palgrave-Macmillan.