Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma

Alvin E. Roth*, J. Keith Murnighan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

156 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines a model of the prisoner's dilemma in which the nature of the Nash equilibria of the game can be varied. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). Preliminary experimental results indicate that the nature of the equilibria of a game affect the amount of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-198
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Mathematical Psychology
Volume17
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1978

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

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