Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games

Yingkai Li, Harry Pei*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number105222
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
StatePublished - Apr 2021


  • Action frequency
  • Behavior
  • Concentration inequality
  • Refinement
  • Reputation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this