Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies

R. J. Weber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Herein we present a single example with three purposes: (1) to show the existence of equilibria in a game which violates the assumptions of currently available general existence theorems; (2) to illustrate the importance of the "affiliation" assumption in economic games of incomplete information, by showing how even a slight relaxation can lead to the nonexistence of equilibria in monotone strategies; and, most importantly, (3) to exhibit an equilibrium point in strategies which partially reveal information without inducing posterior partitionings of the players′ type spaces. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)286-294
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 1994

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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