Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games

Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin

Research output: Working paper


We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation.
Original languageEnglish (US)
PublisherSocial Science Research Network (SSRN)
Number of pages28
StatePublished - Oct 16 2009


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