Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution

Horace P. Yuen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is not the case the generated key is perfect with probability ≥ 1 - e under the trace distance criterion d ≤ e, which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis. Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEmerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 16 2013
EventEmerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X - Dresden, Germany
Duration: Sep 23 2013Sep 26 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering
Volume8899
ISSN (Print)0277-786X
ISSN (Electronic)1996-756X

Other

OtherEmerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X
CountryGermany
CityDresden
Period9/23/139/26/13

Fingerprint

Quantum cryptography
Quantum Key Distribution
Security Proof
Error correction
Quantum noise
Cryptography
Error Correction
Unconditional Security
Communication
Quantum Noise
Chemical analysis
decoys
Ramification
Continuous Variables
Cryptosystem
Quantitative Analysis
tradeoffs
quantitative analysis
Disturbance
Trade-offs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Yuen, H. P. (2013). Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution. In Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X [88990J] (Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering; Vol. 8899). https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082
Yuen, Horace P. / Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution. Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X. 2013. (Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering).
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Yuen, HP 2013, Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution. in Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X., 88990J, Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, vol. 8899, Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X, Dresden, Germany, 9/23/13. https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082

Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution. / Yuen, Horace P.

Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X. 2013. 88990J (Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering; Vol. 8899).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Yuen HP. Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution. In Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X. 2013. 88990J. (Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082