Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens

Jeroen M. Swinkels*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

A simple and intuitive condition on a set of strategy profiles guarantees that the set has a strategically stable subset. The condition arises naturally in evolutionary contexts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)333-342
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume57
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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