Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory

Jeffrey C. Ely, William H. Sandholm*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents' preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)83-109
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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