TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolution in Bayesian games I
T2 - Theory
AU - Ely, Jeffrey C.
AU - Sandholm, William H.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Drew Fudenberg, Josef Hofbauer, Larry Samuelson, and Jörgen Weibull, two anonymous referees and an anonymous Associate Editor, and seminar audiences at the Stockholm School of Economics and at Wisconsin for their comments. Results in this paper were previously circulated under the title “Evolution with Diverse Preferences.” Financial support from NSF Grants SBR-9810787 and SES-0092145 is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2005/10
Y1 - 2005/10
N2 - We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents' preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation.
AB - We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents' preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.003
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:26844520372
VL - 53
SP - 83
EP - 109
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 1
ER -