Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory

Jeffrey C. Ely, William H. Sandholm*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

41 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents' preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)83-109
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2005

Funding

We thank Drew Fudenberg, Josef Hofbauer, Larry Samuelson, and Jörgen Weibull, two anonymous referees and an anonymous Associate Editor, and seminar audiences at the Stockholm School of Economics and at Wisconsin for their comments. Results in this paper were previously circulated under the title “Evolution with Diverse Preferences.” Financial support from NSF Grants SBR-9810787 and SES-0092145 is gratefully acknowledged.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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