Evolutionary stability and lexicograpic preferences

Larry Samuelson*, Jeroen M. Swinkels

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278-305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from "lexicographic evolutionarily stability" (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)332-342
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume44
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2003

Keywords

  • Complexity
  • Evolutionary stability
  • Lexicograhic preferences
  • Lexicographic Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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