Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants

Jeroen M. Swinkels*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

58 Scopus citations

Abstract

The strategy that upsets a potential evolutionarily stable strategy may in itself be very unstable, or may differ from the candidate strategy only in irrelevant ways. This paper develops a solution concept addressing these difficulties. We lood for a set of Nash equilibria such that small groups of entrants whose members are satisfied with their entry cannot take the population out of the set. Such a set is robust to the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies, depends only on the reduced normal form, and has the never a weak best response property. For generic two person extensive form games, such sets generate payoffs consistent with proper equilibria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)306-332
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume57
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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