Abstract
A family of excess functions is defined for cooperative n-person nonsidepayment games It is shown that by using these excess functions the epsilon -core, kernel, and nucleolus of a nonsidepayment game can be defined in a way that preserves a significant portion of the structure that these concepts exhibit in the sidepayment case. Some excess functions are extensions of the sidepayment games' ″excesses″ . It is also shown that the set of nucleoli that exist for some excess functions is precisely the set of reasonable (in a core sense) outcomes of a game.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 60-71 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 1975 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Applied Mathematics