Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm

Dylan Blu Minor

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and environmental harm. We find that high-powered executive compensation packages can increase the odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by over 100%. We document similar results for the setting of executive compensation and financial accounting misconduct. Finally, we outline some managerial and policy implications to blunt these adverse incentive effects.
Original languageEnglish (US)
PublisherSocial Science Research Network (SSRN)
Number of pages49
StatePublished - Apr 12 2016

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Executive compensation
Compensation packages
Environmental law
Policy implications
Managerial incentives
Financial accounting
Incentive effect

Cite this

Minor, D. B. (2016). Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm. Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
Minor, Dylan Blu. / Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm. Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2016.
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Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2016.

Research output: Working paper

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