Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences

Eddie Dekel*, Zvi Safra, Uzi Segal

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations

Abstract

Sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given when preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption (RCLA). Without RCLA decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the same probabilities of final outcomes. Therefore the conditions depend on how players perceive the game-whether they view themselves as moving first or second. We also review conditions under which the equilibria will be dynamically consistent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)229-246
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume55
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1991

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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