Factions and political competition

Nicola Persico*, José C R Pueblita, Dan Silverman

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)242-288
Number of pages47
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume119
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2011

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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