TY - JOUR
T1 - Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
AU - Forsythe, Robert
AU - Horowitz, Joel L.
AU - Savin, N. E.
AU - Sefton, Martin
PY - 1994/5
Y1 - 1994/5
N2 - We present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers′ willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games. We examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or dictator) and pay (pay or no pay). The outcomes of the ultimatum and dictator games with pay are significantly different, implying that fairness, by itself, cannot explain the observed behavior. Doubling the amount of money available in games with pay does not affect these results. The outcomes of both games are replicable when players are paid, but the outcome of the ultimatum game is not replicable when players are not paid. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 215.
AB - We present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers′ willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games. We examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or dictator) and pay (pay or no pay). The outcomes of the ultimatum and dictator games with pay are significantly different, implying that fairness, by itself, cannot explain the observed behavior. Doubling the amount of money available in games with pay does not affect these results. The outcomes of both games are replicable when players are paid, but the outcome of the ultimatum game is not replicable when players are not paid. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 215.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1994.1021
DO - 10.1006/game.1994.1021
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:43949150167
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 6
SP - 347
EP - 369
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 3
ER -