Fallibilism

Baron Reed*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements - e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists - there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject's being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully general account of the view. I conclude by looking at the two major difficulties for fallibilism: the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)585-596
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophy Compass
Volume7
Issue number9
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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