Fault tolerance in distributed mechanism design

Ronen Gradwohl*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations


We argue that in distributed mechanism design frameworks it is important to consider not only rational manipulation by players, but also malicious, faulty behavior. To this end, we show that in some instances it is possible to take a centralized mechanism and implement it in a distributed setting in a fault tolerant manner. More specifically, we examine two distinct models of distributed mechanism design - a Nash implementation with the planner as a node on the network, and an ex post Nash implementation with the planner only acting as a "bank". For each model we show that the implementation can be made resilient to faults.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 4th International Workshop, WINE 2008, Proceedings
Number of pages9
StatePublished - Dec 1 2008
Event4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Dec 17 2008Dec 20 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5385 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)


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