Abstract
A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies. In the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players, however, it provides no guarantees. Some recent literature has focused on measuring the potential damage caused by the presence of faulty behavior, as well as designing mechanisms that are resilient against such faults. In this paper we show that large games are naturally fault tolerant. We first quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games - λ-continuous games and anonymous games - are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We then show that general large games also have some non-trivial resilience against faults.
| Original language | English (US) |
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| Title of host publication | EC'08 - Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
| Pages | 274-283 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2008 |
| Event | 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08 - Chicago, IL, United States Duration: Jul 8 2008 → Jul 12 2008 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
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Other
| Other | 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'08 |
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| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Chicago, IL |
| Period | 7/8/08 → 7/12/08 |
Funding
This research was supported in part by grant 1300/05 from the Israel Science Foundation . The authors would also like to thank Ariel Yadin for helpful discussions throughout the course of this research, and the anonymous referees for their comments.
Keywords
- Byzantine faults
- Large games
- Nash equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Science Applications
- Computer Networks and Communications