Feminism and epistemic injustice

José Medina*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical work on injustice that is distinctly epistemic. The first part of the chapter focuses on the contributions that classic feminist theorists have made to the conceptualization of issues of epistemic injustice long before such name was available, focusing especially on the writings of feminists of color from the seventeenth century onward (Sojourner Truth, Maria Stewart, Gloria Anzaldúa, Audre Lorde, etc.). The second half of the chapter focuses on the contributions to recent discussions of epistemic injustice by contemporary feminist scholars, especially Lorraine Code, Kristie Dotson, and Miranda Fricker. The chapter highlights the ways in which the feminist paradigms of intersectionality and standpoint theory have shaped analyses of epistemic injustice and epistemic resistance against injustice, elaborating the key notions of epistemic agency, epistemic responsibility and epistemic advocacy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages408-417
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9780190628925
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2021

Keywords

  • Epistemic agency
  • Epistemic oppression
  • Epistemic resistance
  • Epistemic responsibility
  • Epistemic violence
  • Hermeneutical injustice
  • Intersectionality
  • Standpoint theory
  • Testimonial injustice
  • Women of color feminism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities

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