Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector

B. Holmstrom, Jean Marcal Pierre Tirole

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1125 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring well depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadely consistent with the leading patterns observed during the recent financial crises.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)663-691
    Number of pages29
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
    Volume112
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 1997

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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