Abstract
In a number of interesting environments, dynamic screening involves positive selection: in contrast with Coasian dynamics, only the most motivated remain over time. The paper provides conditions under which the principal's commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks. It also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection, and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1291-1343 |
Number of pages | 53 |
Journal | Econometrica |
Volume | 84 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 1 2016 |
Keywords
- Repeated relationships
- exit games
- positive selection
- screening
- shifting preferences
- time consistency
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics