TY - JOUR
T1 - Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19
AU - Cherry, Susan
AU - Jiang, Erica
AU - Matvos, Gregor
AU - Piskorski, Tomasz
AU - Seru, Amit
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Pascal Noel, Jan Eberly, Amir Sufi, Susan Wachter, and Kairong Xiao for detailed feedback. We also thank Greg Buchak, John Cochrane, Darrell Duffie, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Jim Poterba, and seminar participants at the AREUEA-ASSA meeting, Bank of England, Columbia Leading through Crisis seminar, Housing Finance Policy Center, NBER Real Estate and Household Meetings, Northwestern, Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, Stanford, and Wharton, for helpful comments. Piskorski and Seru thank the National Science Foundation Award (1628895) on “The Transmission from Households to the Real Economy: Evidence from Mortgage and Consumer Credit Markets” for financial support.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Brookings Institution Press. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/9/1
Y1 - 2021/9/1
N2 - We study the suspension of household debt payments (debt forbearance) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Between March 2020 and May 2021, more than 70 million consumers with loans worth $2.3 trillion entered forbearance, missing $86 billion of their payments. This debt relief can help explain the absence of consumer defaults relative to the evolution of economic fundamentals. Borrowers’ self-selection is a powerful force in determining forbearance rates: relief flows to households suffering pandemic-induced shocks that would otherwise have faced debt distress. Moreover, 55 percent of forbearance is provided to less creditworthy borrowers with above median income and higher debt balances—that is, those excluded from income-based policies, such as the stimulus check program. A fifth of borrowers in forbearance con-tinued making full payments, suggesting that forbearance acts as a credit line. By May 2021, about 60 percent of borrowers had already exited forbearance while more financially vulnerable and lower income borrowers were still in forbearance with an accumulated debt overhang of about $60 billion. Exploit-ing a discontinuity in mortgage eligibility under the CARES Act, we estimate that implicit government debt relief subsidies increase the rate of forbearance by about a third. Government relief is provided through private intermediaries, with shadow banks less likely to provide forbearance than traditional banks.
AB - We study the suspension of household debt payments (debt forbearance) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Between March 2020 and May 2021, more than 70 million consumers with loans worth $2.3 trillion entered forbearance, missing $86 billion of their payments. This debt relief can help explain the absence of consumer defaults relative to the evolution of economic fundamentals. Borrowers’ self-selection is a powerful force in determining forbearance rates: relief flows to households suffering pandemic-induced shocks that would otherwise have faced debt distress. Moreover, 55 percent of forbearance is provided to less creditworthy borrowers with above median income and higher debt balances—that is, those excluded from income-based policies, such as the stimulus check program. A fifth of borrowers in forbearance con-tinued making full payments, suggesting that forbearance acts as a credit line. By May 2021, about 60 percent of borrowers had already exited forbearance while more financially vulnerable and lower income borrowers were still in forbearance with an accumulated debt overhang of about $60 billion. Exploit-ing a discontinuity in mortgage eligibility under the CARES Act, we estimate that implicit government debt relief subsidies increase the rate of forbearance by about a third. Government relief is provided through private intermediaries, with shadow banks less likely to provide forbearance than traditional banks.
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U2 - 10.1353/eca.2022.0002
DO - 10.1353/eca.2022.0002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85130849532
SN - 0007-2303
VL - 2021-Fall
SP - 141
EP - 221
JO - Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
JF - Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
ER -