Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements

Joseph J. Cordes; Burton A. Weisbrod

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(79)90044-6

Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements

Joseph J. Cordes^*, Burton A. Weisbrod

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

The amount of compensation paid to those harmed by public activities is thought to influence mainly the distributional consequences of public programs. This paper uses a simple model of bureau behavior to examine the response of a public agency to changes in compensation requirements. Under some circumstances, changes in compensation requirements will induce agencies to change both the level and mix of public output. Tests of these predictions using data on U.S. highway construction suggest that the presence of compensation requirements can affect the real output decisions of public agencies and not simply the distributional consequences of their decisions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	47-58
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	11
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(79)90044-6
State	Published - Feb 1979

Funding

*This research was supported in part by the Institute Unl\crsity of Wisconsin-Madison. The authors are grateful Anllr~~n! .\thin\on 1;~ helpful c0mn1cnI~ on an earlier dr;tfi.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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abstract = "The amount of compensation paid to those harmed by public activities is thought to influence mainly the distributional consequences of public programs. This paper uses a simple model of bureau behavior to examine the response of a public agency to changes in compensation requirements. Under some circumstances, changes in compensation requirements will induce agencies to change both the level and mix of public output. Tests of these predictions using data on U.S. highway construction suggest that the presence of compensation requirements can affect the real output decisions of public agencies and not simply the distributional consequences of their decisions.",

author = "Cordes, {Joseph J.} and Weisbrod, {Burton A.}",

note = "Funding Information: *This research was supported in part by the Institute Unl\crsity of Wisconsin-Madison. The authors are grateful Anllr~~n! .\thin\on 1;~ helpful c0mn1cnI~ on an earlier dr;tfi.",

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AB - The amount of compensation paid to those harmed by public activities is thought to influence mainly the distributional consequences of public programs. This paper uses a simple model of bureau behavior to examine the response of a public agency to changes in compensation requirements. Under some circumstances, changes in compensation requirements will induce agencies to change both the level and mix of public output. Tests of these predictions using data on U.S. highway construction suggest that the presence of compensation requirements can affect the real output decisions of public agencies and not simply the distributional consequences of their decisions.

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Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements

Abstract

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