Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements

Joseph J. Cordes*, Burton A. Weisbrod

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

The amount of compensation paid to those harmed by public activities is thought to influence mainly the distributional consequences of public programs. This paper uses a simple model of bureau behavior to examine the response of a public agency to changes in compensation requirements. Under some circumstances, changes in compensation requirements will induce agencies to change both the level and mix of public output. Tests of these predictions using data on U.S. highway construction suggest that the presence of compensation requirements can affect the real output decisions of public agencies and not simply the distributional consequences of their decisions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)47-58
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1979

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Governmental behavior in response to compensation requirements'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this