Group Fairness: From Multiwinner Voting to Participatory Budgeting

Edith Elkind*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Many cities around the world allocate a part of their budget based on residents’ votes, following a process known as participatory budgeting. It is important to understand which outcomes of this process should be viewed as fair, and whether fair outcomes could be computed efficiently. We summarise recent progress on this topic. We first focus on a special case of participatory budgeting where all candidate projects have the same cost (known as multiwinner voting), formulate progressively more demanding notions of fairness for this setting, and identify efficiently computable voting rules that satisfy them. We then discuss the challenges of extending these ideas to the general model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication34th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, ISAAC 2023
EditorsSatoru Iwata, Satoru Iwata, Naonori Kakimura
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
ISBN (Electronic)9783959772891
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2023
Event34th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, ISAAC 2023 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: Dec 3 2023Dec 6 2023

Publication series

NameLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Volume283
ISSN (Print)1868-8969

Conference

Conference34th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, ISAAC 2023
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityKyoto
Period12/3/2312/6/23

Keywords

  • justified representation
  • multiwinner voting
  • participatory budgeting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

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