Abstract
Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge merely for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 341-369 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | Nous |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2023 |
Funding
For helpful conversation or comments, I am grateful to an anonymous referee, Elizabeth Jackson, Sandy Goldberg, Chris Willard‐Kyle, Joshua Spencer, Yasha Sapir, Geoff Pynn, Mylan Engel, Ginger Schultheis, Melina Garibovic, audiences at Northern Illinois University and University of Chicago, and students in my Fall 2019 and Spring 2021 graduate seminars at University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. A special thanks is owed to Laura Frances Callahan for extremely helpful feedback. This paper was supported in Summer 2021 by the UWM Advancing Research and Creativity Award.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy