Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry

Peter van Elswyk*, Yasha Sapir

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

What sort of epistemic positions are compatible with inquiries driven by interrogative attitudes like wonder and puzzlement? The ignorance norm provides a partial answer: interrogative attitudes directed at a particular question are never compatible with knowledge of the question’s answer. But some are tempted to think that interrogative attitudes are incompatible with weaker positions like belief as well. This paper defends that the ignorance norm is exhaustive. All epistemic positions weaker than knowledge directed at the answer to a question are compatible with having an interrogative attitude towards that question. We offer two arguments for this conclusion. The first is based on considerations about the role of hedging in inquiry. The second is conditional on considerations related to the aim of inquiry as a goal-directed activity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5837-5859
Number of pages23
JournalSynthese
Volume199
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021

Keywords

  • Hedging
  • Inquiry
  • Interrogative attitudes
  • Knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this