Abstract
In this essay, I identify the conditions Hegel places on responsible agency by taking an indirect and surprisingly untraveled route, one that approaches Hegel's theory of responsibility (Schuld) through his theory of innocence (Unschuld). I show that, on Hegel's account, a responsible agent must satisfy three conditions, the most controversial of which is that she must be a recognized member of a state. I then show that Hegel's argument that state recognition plays a role in the constitution of agents should be understood as a radicalization of Kant's account of the exeundum e statu naturali. What Kant argues with regard to property rights-that they lack determinacy and validity in the state of nature-Hegel argues is true of all our rights and duties. By broadening Kant's account in this way, Hegel generates a conception of the state of nature as a state of innocence: a condition in which there is nothing to be responsible for and, hence, no way of being a responsible agent.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 159-176 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | History of Philosophy Quarterly |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 2 |
State | Published - Apr 2014 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy