How can beliefs wrong?—A Strawsonian epistemology

Berislav Marušić, Stephen White

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

35 Scopus citations


We take a tremendous interest in how other people think of us. We have certain expectations of others, concerning how we are to figure in their thought and judgment. And we often feel wronged if those are disappointed. But it is puzzling how others’ beliefs could wrong us. On the one hand, moral considerations don’t bear on the truth of a belief and so seem to be the wrong kind of reasons for belief. On the other hand, truth-directed considerations seem to render moral considerations redundant. In this paper, we argue that to understand the possibility of doxastic wronging, we need to understand beliefs, no less than actions, as ways of relating to one another. In particular, how we take account of what others think and say will depend on whether we take up what P. F. Strawson calls the participant stance toward them. We show how this helps to make sense of an example Miranda Fricker identifies as a case of epistemic injustice. We then use the example to spell out the ethical significance of Tyler Burge’s idea that we have a default entitlement to accept at face value what we receive from a rational source.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)97-114
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Topics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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