How efficient is dynamic competition? The case of price as investment

David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3339-3364
Number of pages26
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume109
Issue number9
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'How efficient is dynamic competition? The case of price as investment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this