How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana

Kate Baldwin; Dean Karlan; Christopher Udry; Ernest Appiah

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106296

How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana

Kate Baldwin^*, Dean Karlan, Christopher Udry, Ernest Appiah

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although participatory development often aims specifically to mitigate problems from political biases and party-based clientelism, the path is complicated and depends critically on the efficacy of underlying programs as well as how they interact with pre-existing institutions. We provide a framework to understand when participatory development is likely to generate politically biased benefits, showing that even if participatory aid is neutrally allocated, neutral benefit realizations occur only under specific circumstances. We apply this framework to a five-year randomized controlled study of a major participatory development program in Ghana, analyzing the program's effects on participation in, leadership of, and investment by pre-existing political institutions, and on households’ overall socioeconomic well-being. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectations for the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance and reallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. This demonstrates aid's complex distributional consequences.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	106296
Journal	World Development
Volume	169
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106296
State	Published - Sep 2023

Funding

We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University’s Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own. We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University's Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own.

Keywords

Distributive politics
International aid
Participatory development
Political economy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Geography, Planning and Development
Development
Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106296

Cite this

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title = "How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana",

abstract = "Although participatory development often aims specifically to mitigate problems from political biases and party-based clientelism, the path is complicated and depends critically on the efficacy of underlying programs as well as how they interact with pre-existing institutions. We provide a framework to understand when participatory development is likely to generate politically biased benefits, showing that even if participatory aid is neutrally allocated, neutral benefit realizations occur only under specific circumstances. We apply this framework to a five-year randomized controlled study of a major participatory development program in Ghana, analyzing the program's effects on participation in, leadership of, and investment by pre-existing political institutions, and on households{\textquoteright} overall socioeconomic well-being. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectations for the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance and reallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. This demonstrates aid's complex distributional consequences.",

keywords = "Distributive politics, International aid, Participatory development, Political economy",

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note = "Funding Information: We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University{\textquoteright}s Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own. Funding Information: We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University's Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 Elsevier Ltd",

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doi = "10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106296",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "169",

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N1 - Funding Information: We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University’s Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own. Funding Information: We thank The Hunger Project for their collaboration throughout this long-term project, and the Robertson Foundation for funding (Award number 9903017). IRB approval was received from Yale University Protocol # 1301011377 and from Innovations for Poverty Action Protocol #13July-002. We thank the field and data team at Innovations for Poverty Action: Alexis Devonish, Hana Freymiller, Sana Khan, Joe Long, Elana Safran, Sneha Stephens and Bram Thuysbaert, as well as Humphrey K. Dickson and Onallia E. Osei, who helped collect qualitative data. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Matthew Winters and participants in seminars at the African Studies Association, Duke University, EGAP, Harvard University, McGill University and Yale University's Leitner Political Economy Seminar. All errors and opinions are our own. Publisher Copyright: © 2023 Elsevier Ltd

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N2 - Although participatory development often aims specifically to mitigate problems from political biases and party-based clientelism, the path is complicated and depends critically on the efficacy of underlying programs as well as how they interact with pre-existing institutions. We provide a framework to understand when participatory development is likely to generate politically biased benefits, showing that even if participatory aid is neutrally allocated, neutral benefit realizations occur only under specific circumstances. We apply this framework to a five-year randomized controlled study of a major participatory development program in Ghana, analyzing the program's effects on participation in, leadership of, and investment by pre-existing political institutions, and on households’ overall socioeconomic well-being. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectations for the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance and reallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. This demonstrates aid's complex distributional consequences.

AB - Although participatory development often aims specifically to mitigate problems from political biases and party-based clientelism, the path is complicated and depends critically on the efficacy of underlying programs as well as how they interact with pre-existing institutions. We provide a framework to understand when participatory development is likely to generate politically biased benefits, showing that even if participatory aid is neutrally allocated, neutral benefit realizations occur only under specific circumstances. We apply this framework to a five-year randomized controlled study of a major participatory development program in Ghana, analyzing the program's effects on participation in, leadership of, and investment by pre-existing political institutions, and on households’ overall socioeconomic well-being. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectations for the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance and reallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. This demonstrates aid's complex distributional consequences.

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How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana

Abstract

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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