How to think about fallibilism

Baron Reed*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only the connection between fallibility and error, but the connection between fallibility and accidental truth as well.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-157
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume107
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'How to think about fallibilism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this