Hybrid Memristor-CMOS Obfuscation Against Untrusted Foundries

Amin Rezaei, Jie Gu, Hi Zhou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

13 Scopus citations


The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. In addition, with the growing number of untrusted foundries, the possibility of inside foundry attack is escalating. However, by taking advantage of polymorphic gates, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently design hybrid memristor-CMOS circuits. In this paper, we propose a hardware obfuscation method based on polymorphic hybrid memristor-CMOS technology. Overhead of the polymorphic designs and the time complexity of possible attacks are discussed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2019 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2019
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781538670996
StatePublished - Jul 2019
Event18th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2019 - Miami, United States
Duration: Jul 15 2019Jul 17 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI
ISSN (Print)2159-3469
ISSN (Electronic)2159-3477


Conference18th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States


  • Hardware Obfuscation, Polymorphic Gates, Memristor, Inside Foundry Attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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