Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

Caio Waisman

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015

Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

Caio Waisman^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

This note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-3
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	144
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015
State	Published - Jul 1 2016

Keywords

Discriminatory auctions
Empirical auctions
Nonparametric identification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015

Cite this

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title = "Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand",

abstract = "This note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand.",

keywords = "Discriminatory auctions, Empirical auctions, Nonparametric identification",

author = "Caio Waisman",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016.",

year = "2016",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015",

language = "English (US)",

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KW - Nonparametric identification

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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