Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

Caio Waisman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-3
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume144
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2016

Keywords

  • Discriminatory auctions
  • Empirical auctions
  • Nonparametric identification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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