Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response

Charles F. Manski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Scopus citations

Abstract

Experimental economics shares with econometrics the objective of inference on decision processes from data on observed behavior. However, experimentalists and econometricians have gone about their research in different ways, the former mainly using exploratory modes of analysis and the latter stressing formal inference on the distribution of decision rules that yield observed choices. An important concern of econometric research has been to determine the identifiability of agents' decision rules when choice data are combined with various forms of other information. This paper examines the identifiability of decision rules from experimental data on choices in simple games of proposal and response.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)880-891
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume46
Issue number4-5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

Keywords

  • Experimental economics
  • Identification
  • Social interactions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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