Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: the use of multi-stage games

Sandeep Baliga*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)173-183
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1999

Keywords

  • Implementation; incomplete information; multi-stage games; sequential equilibrium; economic environments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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