TY - JOUR
T1 - Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information
T2 - the use of multi-stage games
AU - Baliga, Sandeep
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2004 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.
PY - 1999/5
Y1 - 1999/5
N2 - This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.
AB - This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.
KW - Implementation; incomplete information; multi-stage games; sequential equilibrium; economic environments
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0347173091&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1998.0667
DO - 10.1006/game.1998.0667
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0347173091
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 27
SP - 173
EP - 183
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -