TY - GEN
T1 - Improved non-interactive zero knowledge with applications to post-quantum signatures
AU - Katz, Jonathan
AU - Kolesnikov, Vladimir
AU - Wang, Xiao
N1 - Funding Information:
This material is based on work supported by NSF awards #1111599 and #1563722. Work of the second and third authors was done in part while at Bell Labs, and was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) under contract number N00014-14-C0113. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes not withstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2018/10/15
Y1 - 2018/10/15
N2 - Recent work, including ZKBoo, ZKB++, and Ligero, has developed efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoKs) for Boolean circuits based on symmetric-key primitives alone, using the “MPC-in-the-head” paradigm of Ishai et al. We show how to instantiate this paradigm with MPC protocols in the preprocessing model; once optimized, this results in an NIZKPoK with shorter proofs (and comparable computation) as in prior work for circuits containing roughly 300-100,000 AND gates. In contrast to prior work, our NIZKPoK also supports witness-independent preprocessing, which allows the prover to shift most of its work to an offline phase before the witness is known. We use our NIZKPoK to construct a signature scheme based only on symmetric-key primitives (and hence with “post-quantum” security). The resulting scheme has shorter signatures than the scheme built using ZKB++ (and comparable signing/verification time), and is even competitive with hash-based signature schemes. To further highlight the flexibility and power of our NIZKPoK, we also use it to build efficient ring and group signatures based on symmetric-key primitives alone. To our knowledge, the resulting schemes are the most efficient constructions of these primitives that offer post-quantum security.
AB - Recent work, including ZKBoo, ZKB++, and Ligero, has developed efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoKs) for Boolean circuits based on symmetric-key primitives alone, using the “MPC-in-the-head” paradigm of Ishai et al. We show how to instantiate this paradigm with MPC protocols in the preprocessing model; once optimized, this results in an NIZKPoK with shorter proofs (and comparable computation) as in prior work for circuits containing roughly 300-100,000 AND gates. In contrast to prior work, our NIZKPoK also supports witness-independent preprocessing, which allows the prover to shift most of its work to an offline phase before the witness is known. We use our NIZKPoK to construct a signature scheme based only on symmetric-key primitives (and hence with “post-quantum” security). The resulting scheme has shorter signatures than the scheme built using ZKB++ (and comparable signing/verification time), and is even competitive with hash-based signature schemes. To further highlight the flexibility and power of our NIZKPoK, we also use it to build efficient ring and group signatures based on symmetric-key primitives alone. To our knowledge, the resulting schemes are the most efficient constructions of these primitives that offer post-quantum security.
KW - Zero-knowledge proof; Post-quantum signature
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85056886844&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1145/3243734.3243805
DO - 10.1145/3243734.3243805
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85056886844
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 525
EP - 537
BT - CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018
Y2 - 15 October 2018
ER -