In response to Jurg Steiner's concept stretching: The case of deliberation

David Austen-Smith; Timothy J. Feddersen

doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210187

In response to Jurg Steiner's concept stretching: The case of deliberation

David Austen-Smith^*, Timothy J. Feddersen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Steiner's principal objection to our paper is that deliberators in a committee are permitted to speak strategically whereas deliberative theory requires that actors do not lie but are truthful and authentic in their statements. In this response we observe that such a prescription is relevant only to the extent that individuals might be expected to behave otherwise. Our paper explores conditions under which deliberators' strategic (descriptive) incentives are aligned with the (prescriptive) advice to tell the truth.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	191-193
Number of pages	3
Journal	European Political Science
Volume	7
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210187
State	Published - Jun 1 2008

Keywords

Deliberation
Strategic incentives
Truth telling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Political Science and International Relations

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10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210187

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