Incentives and resource sharing in spectrum commons

Junjik Bae*, Eyal Beigman, Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh Vohra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

It has been suggested that light regulation in the form of etiquette protocols, device design and bargaining amongst users will suffice to mitigate a tragedy of the commons in unlicensed spectrum. In this paper we propose a game theoretic model to examine this claim. In this game, each user decides whether or not to set up an access point, which operates on a particular (single) band. The effect of regulation is modeled in reduced form through transfers. A user who sets up an access point, provides payments to each neighbor who does not and suffers a disutility depending on the number of interfering access points. A user who does not set up an access point, receives payments from each neighbor that does. For a suitable model of payoffs, the game is a potential game and best response updates converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. For any interference parameters, there is a suitable transfer resulting in a Nash equilibrium which is efficient. However, all Nash equilibria may not be efficient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2008
Pages261-270
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2008 - Chicago, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 14 2008Oct 17 2008

Publication series

Name2008 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2008

Other

Other2008 3rd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2008
CountryUnited States
CityChicago, IL
Period10/14/0810/17/08

Keywords

  • Commons model
  • Equilibrium
  • Interference mitigation
  • Potential game
  • Tragedy of commons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Communication

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