Incentives to teach badly: After-school tutoring in developing countries

Seema Jayachandran*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

Schools in developing countries frequently offer for-profit tutoring to their own students. This potentially gives teachers a perverse incentive to teach less during school to increase demand for their tutoring. Through this mechanism, the market for tutoring can adversely affect student learning, especially for students who do not participate in tutoring. I model and present empirical evidence on these effects, using survey and test score data from Nepal. The evidence suggests that when schools offer for-profit tutoring, teachers teach less during the regular school day. As a consequence, performance on the national secondary-school exam appears to suffer among students with a low propensity to enroll in tutoring. An implication is that discouraging teachers from tutoring their own students or reducing entry barriers for third-party tutors could increase student achievement.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)190-205
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Volume108
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2014

Keywords

  • Education
  • School quality
  • Teacher incentives
  • Tutoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Development
  • Economics and Econometrics

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