@article{32867594f1754923ade2af489e2ce10b,
title = "Informal communication",
abstract = "The typical sender-receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in games with uninformed receiver. To achieve information revelation as a unique equilibrium, receiver may have to ask for information, which is extraneous for her decision. If sender's honesty concerns are not too strong, asking for extraneous information may create an incentive for lying.",
keywords = "Sender-receiver games",
author = "Wojciech Olszewski",
note = "Funding Information: The results of this paper were presented at Caltech, Catholic University of Louvain - CORE, LSE, Northwestern, Kellogg - MEDS, NYU, Princeton, Stanford -GSB, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, University of Rochester, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Society of Economic Design Conference in 2002. I thank the workshop participants of these institutions for remarks. I am especially grateful to Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer for conversations on this and related research, as well as for numerous suggestions and remarks on previous drafts of this paper, and I also greatly appreciate conversations with Avinash Dixit. Finally, I am grateful to the associate editor and three referees for their comments. Financial assistance from the Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. Copyright: Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2004",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "117",
pages = "180--200",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}