Informal communication

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Scopus citations


The typical sender-receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in games with uninformed receiver. To achieve information revelation as a unique equilibrium, receiver may have to ask for information, which is extraneous for her decision. If sender's honesty concerns are not too strong, asking for extraneous information may create an incentive for lying.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)180-200
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Aug 2004


  • Sender-receiver games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Informal communication'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this